Uncorrected transcript provided by Morningside Partners.
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CSPAN

Moderator: Peter Slen

February 10, 2008

PETER SLEN, HOST, C-SPAN’S “NEWSMAKERS”: This is C-SPAN’s “Newsmakers” program. And Major General Rick Lynch, commanding general of the Multi-National Division Center of the Iraq – if I may start again.

Sorry. I apologize, everybody.

PETER SLEN, HOST, C-SPAN’S “NEWSMAKERS”: This is C-SPAN’s “Newsmakers” program. And joining us from Baghdad is Major General Rick Lynch, who is the commanding general of the Multinational Division Center in Iraq.

Here to question him on “Newsmakers,” Ann Scott Tyson of the “Washington Post,” and Gordon Lubold of the “Christian Science Monitor.”

General, if I could start the questioning this morning. Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, Michael Mullen, yesterday said at a hearing at the Armed Forces Committee, that the armed forces are significantly stressed, because of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that the pace of ongoing operations has prevented our forces from fully training for the full spectrum of operations, and that impacts our ability to be ready to counter future threats.

Do you agree with that statement?

MAJOR GENERAL RICH LYNCH, COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL DIVISION CENTER, BAGHDAD: Well, I mean, there’s a lot of variables in that, Peter. I mean, just think about what you said.

We, as a division, 11 months ago as we trained for Operation Iraqi Freedom, we had the time to do full spectrum operations training. We did everything from COIN operations through high-level collective gunnery. We were able to do that. And then, since we’ve been here, we’ve been able to use those skills in a variety of means.

The stress is really on the soldier and the soldier’s family. I mean, these 15-month deployments are difficult deployments. Fifteen months is not 12 plus three.

What you end up doing is missing multiple holidays – two Christmases, two Easters, two sets of birthdays. And that’s difficult for the soldier, and it’s difficult for the soldier’s family.

But I’ve got to tell you, my soldiers over here are focused on the mission.

You know, we continue to talk about taking the fight to the enemy. We make every opportunity available for them to talk back to their families. We as an army are focused on the families. We’ve signed the Army Family Covenant to focus on the families and to meet their needs.

So, there’s a stress. It’s not a stress in being trained and ready, because we were able to do that – at least my division was. The stress is really on the families and the separation that these long deployments cause.

ANN SCOTT TYSON, MILITARY REPORTER, “WASHINGTON POST”: General, turning to the operations in Iraq, General Petraeus has recently indicated the need for perhaps a slowdown or a brief pause – it could range from one to three months or so – in the drawdown of troops there, to assess the impact of pulling out the surge forces.

What is your sense from where you sit in central Iraq of the need for a pause?

And furthermore, what do you see of the changes in troop levels in your area, where in the past you warned that any drawdown in your area would be very dangerous?

LYNCH: Ann, thanks for that question. You know, everything over here is conditions-based. And we focus on three conditions: the level of the insurgency, the capability of Iraqi security forces and the capacity of the government at all levels. So, those are the conditions that we watch all the time.

So, in my area – as you say, it’s the Multi-National Division Center, so it’s the southern belts of Baghdad and the southern provinces – I can look at those variables very closely and determine, where can we afford to thin the lines by moving out coalition forces, and where do we need to stay?

And in some places in my battle space, I am able to thin the lines. In other places, I need to stay in strength.

So what we’ve done over here, based on the direction of General Petraeus and General Odierno, is we’ve looked closely at what can we do between now and July. And we’ve got enough visibility on those variables that we can make determinations. So, in my area, there will be some reduction, withdrawal and reduction of coalition forces.

But to look past July – boy, that’s a herculean feat. You know, I went to West Point. I’ve been doing this for 30 years. But nobody taught me how to read a crystal ball, and I’m not really sure what those conditions are going to be like in the summertime.

So we’ve got to make sure we look at this as this progresses. I mean, conditions here change all the time. And it’s not like everything across Iraq is the same, or everything across a province is the same. It’s location by location. And you’ve got to give us time to address those variables and make sure that we’ve got a sustained security presence.

TYSON: So, is that …

LYNCH: That’s what this place is all about.

TYSON: It’s …

LYNCH: I mean, when I got here in March – when I got here in March – let me finish this – when I got here in March, we were getting attacked 25 times a day. Now we’re getting attacked less than five times a day. So, we’ve made significant progress.

But it’s a tenuous situation right now, and it’s not time to walk away from it.

TYSON: So, does that very uncertainty lead you to support the idea of having a hiatus in withdrawals, not continuing them at the current rate, but to assess the situation further before moving ahead?

LYNCH: You can’t make a call in February for what this place is going to look like in July. We’ve got to assess the situation as we get closer to the summertime.

Like I said, the withdrawal of the five brigades, we’re all convinced we can manage that – improve capability of Iraqi security forces, the use of these concerned local citizens – we can manage that withdrawal. But you’ve got to give us time between now and the summer to see how the conditions are going and what’s changing, and where can we indeed thin the lines.

You know, we talked about thicken the lines with coalition forces, Iraqi security forces and concerned citizens. Now it’s time to say, OK, given the security situation, where can we thin the lines. But you’ve got to give us time to do that assessment.

GORDON LUBOLD, PENTAGON CORRESPONDENT, “CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR”: Sir, can you give us an assessment a little more on the concerned local citizens? I understand now you refer to them as the “Sons of Iraq.”

What are their numbers? What are the impacts they’re having in your area?

But also, this growing concern. When I was there, I talked to some of your folks about the concern of how you feed them back into the security forces or not. Talk about the jobs program and what the alternatives are ahead.

LYNCH: Yes, thanks, Gordon. And we do indeed now refer to them as the Sons of Iraq – Abnaa al-Iraq – because the people of Iraq and the Iraqi security forces find that to be a more comfortable phrase. And “concerned local citizens” just wasn’t working, so there has been a name change, if you will, because it’s better for the government of Iraq, the Iraqi security forces and the people of Iraq.

So, in my area now, Gordon, I’ve got about 32,000 of these Sons of Iraq. These are the individuals who said, enough is enough – enough of the violence, enough of the intimidation – let us be part of the solution, not part of the problem. So, they’re securing their local areas. They’re securing infrastructure. They’re securing roads. They’re securing their villages.

And of those 32,000, best case, about a third of them will go into the Iraqi security forces. One, because they want to, and two, because they can. They meet the literacy requirements, they meet the age requirements, they meet the physical conditioning.

So, in my particular case, that gives me, of about two-thirds of my concerned citizens, I need a transition over time to something else. Because you can’t just pay these folks for a period of time and then say, hey, I’ve got a good idea – I’m going to stop paying you. It doesn’t work that way over here.

So what we’re looking closely at now is things like public works organizations, a director of public works. You know, I’m the installation commander at Fort Stewart, and at Fort Stewart, Georgia, I have a director of public works. And they take care of the infrastructure – the roads, the buildings, the lawns – they take care of that. And we’re creating those kinds of things over here.

So, Sons of Iraq who are no longer needed in a security posture, but who still need to be employed, we’re transitioning through a variety of job means. We’re sending them off to vo-techs to give them marketable skills. We’re working with local councils to figure out what’s the needs of the local area, and then employing people to meet those needs.

LUBOLD: Two things, if I could.

One is, I’m just curious. Was the perception that the term “concerned local citizens” sounded too Western? But also, do you see in your area that you have the resources, or the kind of non-military civilian resources, to address that transition for those, say, two-thirds who are not going to go into the security forces?

LYNCH: First off, when you translated “concerned local citizens” into Arabic, it portrayed an individual who was worried. And that’s not what our concerned citizens are. They’re not worried; they’re courageous men who are trying to secure their local areas.

So what we tried to do is find a phrase that was comfortable and acceptable. And Abnaa al-Iraq – the Sons of Iraq – seemed to be the most useful phrase. So, that’s what we’re doing with the naming now, and we’re spending way too much time talking about the name.

We have, in my area, sufficient help to help us structure this transition from security forces – Sons of Iraq – to public works units, civilian conservation boards, and those kinds of things. We’re using these EPR teams that have proven to be very effective at the brigade level to figure out, OK, what does this area need? And then, who should we employ to meet those needs?

So, it’s not just the military saying, OK, one day you’re a Son of Iraq and tomorrow you’re a street sweeper. It’s thinking through with the local councils and with the members of the U.S. government how we best transition them to productive jobs.

I mean, Gordon, the conversation here has changed since you were here in August. Remember, when you were here in August, I’d fly into patrol base and I’d find myself planning major combat operations.

Now I fly into the patrol base. I get into a vehicle, or I do a dismounted patrol, and I walk out to talk to the people of Iraq. And the conversation goes like this.

“How is security?”

“Security is fine.”

“What do you need?”

“I need a job. I need employment. I need the schools fixed, I need the roads repaired, I need water, I need electricity.”

So, the conversation has changed.

But I do have sufficient help from all the different agencies to help us work through that.

TYSON: General Lynch, I’d like to ask about the concerned citizens, too, and whether you see them being attacked by al Qaeda in Iraq or other insurgents. How much are they being threatened? And how do you see the insurgency trying to counterattack your successes there?

And tell me a little bit about your Operation Marne Thunderbolt.

LYNCH: OK, I’ll work through those, Ann, one at a time. And then if I miss something, please come back to me.

TYSON: OK.

LYNCH: What we found is – well, I’ll just do the last one first, because that’s the one I’ll remember. Marne Thunderbolt.

I mean, the enemy is still out there. We are in a relentless pursuit phase of this operation. So, early on, back in June when the surge forces arrived, we did Marne Torch, focusing on Arab Jabour, because that area around the Tigris River was a ratline of insurgents into Baghdad.

And remember, my number one job was to block accelerants of violence into Baghdad. The second was to secure the population. The third was defeat sectarian violence.

So, we had to do something about Arab Jabour, so we did with Marne Torch 1 and Marne Torch 2. But I couldn’t reach into the southern portion of Arab Jabour, and that’s where the enemy was hanging out. That’s where al Qaeda was.

So, I went to the corps commander. He gave me an additional battalion. We did detailed shaping operations in the month of January, and then committed ground forces.

And what we did is, we went to where the enemy was. There was a major road intersection in southern Arab Jabour that the enemy wanted. We took it away from them. We built Patrol Base Meade. And from Patrol Base Meade now, we’re doing operations in southern Arab Jabour.

And what’s happening here, Ann, as I’ve told you before is, when we build these patrol bases where the enemy was, the local citizens come forward and ask two questions.

The first question is: Are you going to stay? And the answer to that question is yes. We’re not going to leave. I have 53 patrol bases in our area. We’re not going to leave that patrol base until we can hand it off to capable Iraqi security forces.

And the second question that the locals ask is: How can I help? And that’s how this concerned local citizen program has come up.

So, we’re at the waning days now of Marne Thunderbolt, where we’ve been able to take all of Arab Jabour now and secure all of Arab Jabour. We’ve got a lot of concerned citizens out there.

We’re building them local councils. We’re spending a lot of effort meeting the needs of the people – getting the water pumps working and getting the electricity flowing, getting jobs created, using micro grants to get the stores stood up.

So, we’re transitioning in Arab Jabour now from security to stability. But that really took a lot of combat operations to get to that. So, that’s the Marne Thunderbolt piece.

And you had another question?

TYSON: Yes. The other parts were, do you see attacks specifically targeting the Sons of Iraq, as you’re calling them now, and other ways in which you see the enemy responding to this strategy, trying to continue to attack your latest strategy?

LYNCH: Great question.

So, what we do is, I have priority intelligence requirements, as you know. And one of those is, how are the concerned local citizens doing? Are they being attacked, or are they conducting attacks? And I watch that every day.

We’ve got 1,500 checkpoints manned by the Sons of Iraq in my area. Over the last five months, those 1,500 checkpoints have only been attacked 28 times. And of the 32,000 concerned local citizens I have, only one of the leaders has been murdered. He was a Sunni leader, but I think he was murdered by other Sunnis, and it wasn’t a sectarian issue. And I’m not sure if it was an al Qaeda issue, either.

So, we watch that very closely, this idea of concerned citizens and how are they doing. Are they attacking, or are they being attacked?

And then your other question, what al Qaeda does here is, they’ve got to have the support of the population. They’ve got to have that to survive. So, when we go and do these operations, when they see concerned citizens come up, then they go, “Man, I’ve got a problem.”

So, what they do right away is, they do an attack into the area to knock the local citizens off their game plan, to show them, hey, we’re still here.

I can tell you, though, it’s not working. These Sons of Iraq – and that is, indeed, a good name – these Sons of Iraq are standing up for their villages. And I talk to them all the time.

I’ve got 151 concerned citizen leaders. I’m out talking to them all the time. I ask them, “Why are you doing what you’re doing?”

And the answer is inevitably, “I’m doing it for my children and my children’s children.” They are indeed tired of the intimidation.

So, it’s a powerful thing. I mean, it allowed us to thicken the force from the coalition forces, the Iraqi security forces, the Sons of Iraq. You put those all together and you’ve got a powerful force for security, and that’s why it’s actually dropped from 25 to less than five on a daily basis.

SLEN: This is C-SPAN’s “Newsmakers” program. Our guest is General Rick Lynch, coming to us from Camp Victory in Baghdad.

Ann Scott Tyson of the “Washington Post” and Gordon Lubold of the “Christian Science Monitor” are our panel.

Next question.

LUBOLD: General, I wanted to go back to the tours, and you mentioned it at the beginning. But it was interesting, because this past week, General McNeill, who is the NATO commander in Afghanistan, talked about the concerns he has about the length of tours for NATO members working in southern Afghanistan and their ability to conduct counterinsurgency.

Come back to Iraq. The Army has kind of suggested that, potentially, the 15-month tours could go down to 12.

What do you see as the impact of that on the operations that you have been conducting there, and your ability to conduct them effectively?

LYNCH: Yes, I’m convinced, Gordon, from having done now multiple deployments, that being able to transition back from 15 months to 12 months is going to have a significant impact on the morale of our soldiers and the morale of our soldiers’ families.

Like I say, 15 is not 12 plus three, because when you’re over here for 15 you’re missing about two of everything, and that’s tough enough when you have to miss one. When you have to miss two Christmases or you miss two school years, that’s difficult.

So, being able to ratchet back to 12 months is going to have a significant impact on the morale, not just of my soldiers, but on my soldiers’ families.

And then the other piece is obviously the dwell time. How much time do you get to spend at home between deployments?

And I know General Casey and the leadership of our Army are very attuned to that, and very sensitive to what we have to do to ratchet back from 15 to 12.

LUBOLD: If I could, though, I mean, what kind of an impact do you think it would have on the ability to conduct the operations you’re doing there now? Does a shorter time diminish your soldiers’ abilities to maintain relationships and all the kinds of things that have been working thus far?

LYNCH: A great question, Gordon. It won’t have any impact.

You know, what we do is, when you put a unit at a location, you keep them there for the entire 12 months, for the reason you decided. That allows them to build relationships.

But after that period of time, it’s OK to withdraw and bring in another unit, so they can attain that same relationship.

What we don’t do is, we don’t rotate units all the time. I tell my company commanders, these 53 patrol bases that we have – you know, think about it. Seventy-five percent of my soldiers live amongst the Iraqi population. And where they go initially is where they stay for their deployment, and then they’re building these relationships.

But I don’t see an impact operationally of going from 15 back to 12.

SLEN: Next question.

TYSON: General Lynch, I wanted to ask whether you have seen any uptick in attack or violence trends as a result maybe partly of your more recent operations. That’s happened elsewhere in Iraq.

I’m also wondering whether you could offer your opinions on the long-term security arrangements for Iraq. I mean, you have a large area that has borders with other countries.

Looking a few years into the future, could you give your own opinion on what kind of presence the United States needs to maintain, and what kind of freedom to operate U.S. forces need to have, to continue to secure Iraq?

LYNCH: Again, it’s difficult, Ann, for me to look into a crystal ball, but I’ll address your question.

I mean, Iraq is a sovereign country. Remember what we’ve always said: the end state in Iraq has to be an Iraq that’s at peace with its neighbors, that’s an ally in the war on terror, that has a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and has a domestic – has a security force that can maintain domestic order and deny Iraq a safe haven for terrorists.

And that’s going to take awhile for us to get to that. You don’t go from tyranny to democracy overnight, so this representative government piece is going to take awhile for it to mature. To get a security force that can maintain domestic order and deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists takes some time.

So, there’s going to be a requirement for a security relationship in the years to come. Now, how long that’s going to take, I have no idea. But clearly, there’s going to be a requirement for that.

TYSON: And can you talk about attack trends recently? Has it continued to decline, been the same, gone up at all?

LYNCH: What happens, Ann, is, when we conduct major operations like Marne Thunderbolt, the attacks increase for a short period of time until we kill or capture the enemy. And that’s what I saw at the early phases of Marne Thunderbolt. And then it levels back off again.

And as I say, my average number of attacks now is always less than five. And there has been numerous days now we’ve had no attacks at all – in our area. And that’s the southern belts of Baghdad and the southern provinces. It’s a battle space the size of the state of West Virginia. And to have less than five attacks on a daily basis shows you where we are with the security situation.

But we ought to tell people all the time it’s a tenuous security situation. It could go backwards again. That’s why we’re managing very closely this sustained security presence and working to meet the needs of the people of Iraq.

See, the local population now has come forward. We’ve said all the time – back when I met both you and Gordon in the past – we’ve said all the time that the only people who are going to win this counterinsurgency fight are the people of Iraq. And now, they’re standing up to do just that.

SLEN: General Lynch, how close are the Iraqi security forces in your view to standing up for this fight on their own?

LYNCH: Well, I deal with two Iraqi army division commanders, the 6th Iraqi Army Division commander and the 8th Iraqi Army Division commander. And they are magnificent, professional soldiers. They’re not Sunni or Shia, they’re Iraqi. And if you’re anti-Iraq, they’re anti-you.

And they’ve got great brigade commanders and great battalion commanders. And I’ve got to tell you, with the brigades that I deal with in the Iraqi Army Division, I’m very impressed.

Now, do they have work to do? Sure. Do they need to improve their capability to sustain themselves? Sure.

But that’s why we’re here. We’re here in force with transition teams to improve their capability.

So, over time, I’ve watched the Iraqi army improve on a routine basis. And now, I mean, it’s very impressive. A lot of the operations in my area are Iraqi army pure operations. Many operations – I’m fixing to do another division main operation, where I’m going to put Iraqi army in the lead. That’s how confident I am of their capabilities.

SLEN: Are a lot of those commanders Saddam era commanders?

LYNCH: Well, they’ve all got their own histories, you know. But right now, they’re Iraqi. And right now, they’re focused on meeting the needs of the people of Iraq and securing their areas. And I’m proud to serve with General Abdul Ameer and General Uthman, those two divisions commanders. They are very capable, competent, military professionals.

TYSON: General, I’ve got one other question.

You have quite a mixture of Sunni and Shia in your area. How would you describe the level of sectarian tension there now?

And what do you see as the biggest challenges in rebuilding and governance? Do you see discrimination in terms of the flow of funds from the central government in terms of Sunni and Shia areas?

LYNCH: Yes, thanks for that, Ann.

You know, the third of my three missions was defeat sectarian violence. And I’ve got to tell you, the level of sectarian tension in my area now is greatly diminished. I mean, it’s still there. It’s going to be there for a period of time, but it’s greatly diminished.

And what I’m most happy about is, now we have a feel of the population. The German phrase is Fingerspitzengefuehl – knowing the battlefield. And being able to get out and about all the time with the people of Iraq gives me a sense of how things are going. And there’s a lot of areas where I have Sunni and Shia alike.

You know, I told you I have 151 concerned local citizen groups. About 20 percent of those are mixed – Sunnis and Shias alike, working together to meet the security needs of their local area.

And I see it at the local governance level, as well. I see them and say, OK. Let’s put aside any differences, and let’s focus on what’s right for our family, our kids and their kids. And I see a lot greater Iraqi identification these days. People are saying, “I’m Iraqi.” Not “I’m Sunni,” “I’m Shia.” “I’m Iraqi.”

So, at the level in which I work, I don’t see a lot of sectarian tension or a lot of sectarian violence.

LUBOLD: General, the president’s budget was released this past week, and the defense budget, as well. And it sparked, as budgets usually do, a debate about the way defense money should be spent.

When you return, what would your view be of the focus of how to prepare for ongoing operations, the next war? Is it – do you see a we need to get back to basics? Or a focus on a new kind of operation, similar to what you’ve been doing there?

If you had to choose one, which would it be?

LYNCH: Well, you couldn’t choose one. You’ve got to prepare for full spectrum operations. And now, what’s neat about our Army is, we’re an experience-based Army.

Just think about this. I’ve got company commanders out there that are commanding companies as captains. They were here as a lieutenant as a platoon leader. They came back as a young staff captain. They came back again as a company commander. So they’ve got this unbelievable breadth of experience.

Now, you take that back home and you build on that. You say, OK, we work these counterinsurgency operations for a while. But in case we’ve got to do a full spectrum conflict, let’s get back in our tanks, back in our Bradleys, back in our artillery pieces and prepare for full spectrum operations.

So, that’s exactly what I did bringing the division over last time. And that’s what we’ll do as we go back home and prepare for our next deployment – wherever that is and whenever that is.

LUBOLD: If each of the services have to make tough decisions, and you look within your own service, do you have certain recommendations or certain support or not support for different programs?

The defense secretary said, testifying this past week, FCS – the Future Combat System, for example, an expensive, high-tech program for the Army – may have some difficulty. I just wondered where you think the choices should be made.

LYNCH: Well, I mean, I understand what we’re doing with advanced technology and improving our capability. I’ve got to tell you, Gordon, what I’m seeing now with things like the up-armored Humvee and the MRAP makes me so excited.

I mean, I have soldiers now that have survived IEDs, where they wouldn’t have survived if they had not been in the MRAP. And today I had an IED take off the entire front of an up-armored Humvee, and the worst injury inside that up-armored Humvee was a broken leg, and it could have been catastrophic. So, we’ve got to continue to work on force protection for our soldiers.

The other answer to that question that I believe is very important is focus on the soldier. He’s the centerpiece of everything we do. The U.S. Army is built around our soldier. We’re Army strong, because of our soldiers. So, that really has to be the focus of development.

At the same time, you know, I got a graduate degree from MIT, and I understand advanced technology. And it’s important to pursue things like the Future Combat System, because there are technologies that spin out of that, that apply to other systems that we have on today’s battlefield.

So, it’s not an either-or proposition. It’s a combination of all of the above.

LUBOLD: OK. Fair enough.

When I was there, I think you indicated to me that you had not received any MRAPs, of the up-armored vehicles of the MRAP variety.

Do you have any now? And do you need more?

LYNCH: Oh, yes. I have MRAPs. I have 300 MRAPs. I get my fair share and more coming in. We’ll take all we can get.

You’re not going to find a soldier over here that’s worried about the MRAP. They want to be in that MRAP, because they know what happened last time their buddy was in an MRAP, and they walked away from the explosion.

So, those MRAPs are very important. They’re being fielded in accordance with a fielding plan. The corps commander places them where he needs them. I’ve got about 300, and I’ll get more over time.

But we’ll take all we can get, because it’s a heck of a piece of equipment and saving soldiers’ lives.

SLEN: A final question from Ann Scott Tyson.

TYSON: Could you just give us an update on the influence of the Iranian special groups in your area and the influx of EFPs and other Iranian weaponry, whether you’ve seen that recently?

LYNCH: Ann, thanks for that. We’re still worried about influence from outside of Iraq on extremists – in that case, particularly Shia extremists. And we have seen an uptick in EFPs recently, and those all get traced back to Iran.

As I’ve told you in the past, I’ve found weapons caches with Iranian munitions. We still have those concerns.

Now, whether or not those weapons have come in recently or they’ve been there for awhile, I’m not sure. But it’s still something that’s on our radar screen and we’re watching for all the time.

SLEN: General Rick Lynch is the commanding general of the Multi-National Division Center. He has joined us on “Newsmakers” from Baghdad.

Thank you, sir.

Ann Scott Tyson, what’s your lead? What did you hear?

TYSON: Well, I think it was pretty interesting the way he talked about the proliferation of the concerned citizens groups, as he called them, or now the Sons of Iraq. I’ve been speaking with Major General Lynch over several months, and these forces have really ballooned.

It’s interesting, though, that the U.S. military, as he said, you know, you can’t just go up to these people and say, how about not paying you the next day.

Originally, the military thought they were going to be paying these guys for a few months, and the program has sort of taken on a life of its own. And I think they’re sort of struggling to figure out, how do you transition these people into viable jobs, which has always been a problem in Iraq.

LUBOLD: Right. It becomes an entitlement program, in fact.

SLEN: Essentially on the dole?

LUBOLD: Well, I heard somebody say that. But there is a value to what they’re doing, so it’s – I don’t know that there’s a negative connotation there.

But if it’s allowed to kind of continue without transitioning to either the Iraq security forces or to, as he said, a jobs program, then it does become an entitlement program. And then when you stop it, you do have a problem – security problems and an economic problem, and all the rest of it.

I’m not clear if there is enough of the kind of non-military force there to help oversee that transition for all those thousands of people, just in his area, and whatever the number is for concerned local citizens around the country, as well.

SLEN: You both mentioned – and he did, too – that you have traveled over there and you’ve met with him over there. What was your trip like?

LUBOLD: Well, he’s always been good hosting the press, as it were.

In my case, I met him in Baghdad and took a Black Hawk helicopter ride around. And it was a lot of fun to ride around with the doors open on a hot fall day, but also just to kind of see the different parts of his area of operations, which have changed, I think. I haven’t been there since September, but apparently they’ve changed.

And I think his area is starting to look a little bit more like Anbar, which is the area in the west the Marines have been traditionally deployed to, which has – most people who pay attention – has settled significantly.

TYSON: I have been to his part of Iraq before his unit got there, and it was a very – you know, sort of known as the “triangle of death.” I mean, part of the area that his unit covers – very dangerous. And so, I don’t doubt that there’s this transition going on.

I was with one of his brigades, which is located in Anbar Province, on my last trip there in August, and things were dramatically improved in terms of security. I mean, it was almost unbelievable.

SLEN: Can you give us an example?

TYSON: Well, yes.

LUBOLD: No flaks. Take your flak jacket off if you want.

TYSON: Yes. I mean, they were – the soldiers there and the Marines were comfortable enough to say, you know, “I could take my platoon on a jog down this street and not worry about it.”

Now, they would not do that, but that was their of indicating how comfortable they were.

I mean, in contrast, having been in this area before, I mean, you could basically set your clock on half hour or 45 minutes before you’d be shot at after you went out of the gate of the compound. I mean, it was – this area was just one of the worst I’ve ever been in, in Iraq.

So, dramatic improvements there, which made his hesitation on the question of troop levels interesting. He was not going to comment directly about the need for a pause. He said he was thinning out, but you could sense a reluctance there by a general who in the past has warned quite adamantly about the risks of too early a drawdown and the way the insurgent forces can exploit that.

LUBOLD: You’ve got these soldiers who, as he said, they’re deploying for 15 months. That is a long time. We’ve both spent time with these guys and recognize that.

A lot of these guys are going in – men and women – are going in with one set of circumstances on the ground, and leaving with another. So, there’s this whole sense of accomplishment, and certainly, General Lynch feels this sense of accomplishment. Nobody wants to squander that by making a premature withdrawal.

It’s interesting, though, because as we kind of look to April, when General Petraeus comes back to talk in Washington, his boss, in effect, Secretary Gates, continues to say that, you know, he would like to have more of a drawdown by the end of the year. As you know, the 15 – the five brigades are to come out – or four more – by July. And it’s just unclear how – what impact that’ll have.

SLEN: And we are out of time on “Newsmakers.” Gordon Lubold, “Christian Science Monitor,” Ann Scott Tyson, “Washington Post” – thank you both.

TYSON: My pleasure.

LUBOLD: Thanks.

END