BRIAN LAMB: Fran Townsend, what was the last day that you worked for the George Bush administration?
FRAN TOWNSEND: January 4, 2008.
LAMB: What were you doing?
TOWNSEND: Well, you know it's funny. Up until the very last minute, I was working on documents to present for the president's signature and to leave them for him before I left.
LAMB: About what?
TOWNSEND: Well, there is now - the most important one is classified. And so, but it's been reported in the paper that he signed an executive order, a presidential decision directive, on cyber security. And so, I was working on the preparation of that - literally on my last day - to make sure it was ready for his signature.
LAMB: How long did you spend in the White House? And what was your responsibility?
TOWNSEND: I spent - in two different positions - I spent my first year, beginning in spring of '03 until spring of '04, as the deputy national security advisor for combating terrorism. And then from spring of '04 until my departure, I was the president's homeland security and counterterrorism advisor.
LAMB: Did you talk to him?
TOWNSEND: Yes. Sure. Almost every day.
You know, the president gets, begins his day with the daily intelligence brief. And unfortunately, it continues to this day that there's often terrorism items in there. And so, if there are, I'll attend the daily brief, and we'll speak with him.
But there's always, every week that he gets a terrorism briefing, he gets an intelligence briefing. And so, I'm at those as well.
LAMB: If you are - give us the environment. You're sitting at your desk. Where in the White House complex? And what was a day like?
TOWNSEND: Sure. Well, we have - the euphemism of the ground floor is another for saying the basement of the West Wing, which means I'm in an office that is literally equal in steps and distance to the White House situation room or up the back stairs to the Oval Office. It's the two places I wound up spending most of my time.
Because so much of what I dealt with is classified, it made sense that I was in a windowless office, because it needed to be a secure environment. So, my deputy and I sit in the basement of the West Wing.
The day begins, oh, I'd say around 6:30 in the morning when a White House car would come to get me, bring me in. And I would begin by reading the daily intelligence brief and getting a briefing from the CIA officer to prepare myself for what would be the morning meetings.
There's a senior staff meeting that's hosted by the president's chief of staff at 7:30. From there you go into the daily intelligence brief, if I was attending that with the president.
And then there's a series of really what are policy meetings, whether they're with the principals, so the Cabinet level - those are generally scheduled in the afternoon - or with the deputies.
I also meet with both of my deputies - one on the counterterrorism side and one on the homeland side - to make sure that I understand what are the pressing issues that need my attention.
First and foremost, the primary thing I did every day was look at the threat information. The president made very clear, our primary responsibility was to stop the next attack. And so, what you want to be certain of is, you know what the current intelligence and developments are, and we're taking every action possible to prevent the next attack.
LAMB: As you sat at your desk and you looked out around the government, who would you interact with on a weekly basis?
TOWNSEND: Well, on a daily basis I dealt with Secretary Chertoff at the Department of Homeland Security, Director Mueller at the FBI, Director Hayden at the CIA, frequently with the attorney general, because of the legal issues involved, your prosecutions and law enforcement. So, those are the really - really, I think, the primary players.
I also had tremendous interaction with the national security advisor, Steve Hadley, because my counterterrorism responsibilities were worldwide. And so, I frequently would have interaction either with the heads of foreign intelligence services or heads of state throughout the Middle East.
LAMB: How long a day would you have?
TOWNSEND: Days went - on average, I'd leave the West Wing at eight or nine o'clock in the evening, unless I had an event where I was going to a dinner or giving a speech in the evening, I might leave earlier.
Saturdays are work days in the West Wing. So, they - of course, the president gets his daily intelligence brief. Sundays are a day of family and rest and church.
And I was actually very fortunate, because I had two small children. I had worked out that I would come in on Saturdays if there was something to do, a threat or something important, or there was an intelligence brief that I needed to participate in.
But people, gratefully, were very respectful of the fact that, with two small boys, Saturdays are days of soccer and baseball. And so, I needed to try and make an effort to be at home.
LAMB: What impact do you think personally that 9/11 has had on this country?
TOWNSEND: You know, it's tremendous in many respects. And yet, the resiliency - what really impresses me is the spirit of resiliency in this country.
Do I think people understand that there are those out there who want to continue to do us harm? Yes.
I worry that as we get further and further from September 11th, there's a certain amount of complacency, that the American people have begun to view this as "The government will deal with the threats, but I don't have to worry about it."
And the reason I worry about that is, the government will only be successful as long as the American people are supporting the efforts of the government. And so, I do worry a little bit that people - with time and distance - people don't see the continued urgency that those of us who look at the daily intelligence briefs know is real.
LAMB: So, in your job, what was your number one concern? I know you said "threat." But what were you always looking at to see where the threat was? And I assume some of it, you can't tell us.
TOWNSEND: Well, that's right.
What you're looking at is the network, the activity of the network worldwide. It's not as though it's - there are centers of gravity. But you're looking at the communications, you're looking at travel, you're looking at the intelligence sort of reports - not only U.S. intelligence reports.
We're much stronger and better protected today, because of our relationships with foreign intelligence services, which is much more transparent, particularly in the area of terrorism, where we're sharing information. It gives you more pieces to the puzzle to better evaluate how far along are they, how serious are they in a particular plot. And what that means is, more opportunities to disrupt it.
LAMB: You've been in government for how long?
TOWNSEND: It was 23 years.
LAMB: Well, why did you leave?
TOWNSEND: Well, you know, it's a combination of reasons. One, you know, as we got into the politics of the presidential election year, I am not a political person. I have worked for both Democratic and Republican administrations. The politics of Washington has become so acrimonious, I questioned my ability to really - how effective were we going to be?
The perfect example is, you know, we got this extension for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act sort of reform called Protect America. It was only good for six months. As we know now, it expired. They have extended it for two weeks.
But something so basic, such a basic tool couldn't get sort of passed, the reform - a statute that goes back to 1978. I found that frustrating, frankly.
And so, I decided maybe I could be more effective being on the outside, helping through public speeches and media to frame these very important issues, as the candidates will debate them in the '08 election.
LAMB: What did the president say to you when you said you were leaving?
TOWNSEND: He was very gracious. We had several - it was not conversation, it was several over a period of months. He very much would have liked me to stay, but he was gracious and understanding about the toll it takes, both personally and on one's family.
LAMB: What's he like on a one-on-one?
TOWNSEND: He is incredibly warm. And he is incredibly - you know, the interesting thing to me is, when I - when people ask me, "How involved is he in your issues," I must tell you, you know, the great joy was, while you're working these incredibly long hours, I'm working on the single most important issue to him. There's - I can't think of anything he cares more about than stopping the next attack.
For that reason, he's also incredibly detail oriented. He trusts people. He very much gives commander's intent, and then sends you off to do it.
But I will tell you, I've sat with him in daily briefings, where he's getting Arabic names, three and four names, and family names and nom de guerres - you know, warnings. And he'll remember, "Isn't that the guy that you told me in the plot three months ago?"
I mean, the notion that the president of the United States is that engaged and leading and directing the response to the threat, I think would surprise people.
LAMB: Recently, John McCain said in some forum, and I tried to find the exact quote, "If I'm elected president, I will get Osama bin Laden."
What do you think when you hear some candidate for office say that?
TOWNSEND: Well, I expect, given what I know to be the president's direction, that they won't have that opportunity, because the president's been very clear, he intends to get Osama bin Laden before the end of the administration.
That's obviously not an easy task. If it was, it would have happened by now.
But the president has given the direction, and the government has organized itself - intelligence, military, law enforcement assets - to find and bring bin Laden to justice.
And I know it's the president's expectation that he will be successful, that the government, we will be successful before the end of his term.
You know, I think it's as important a catharsis for the American people that we get bin Laden. But he also continues to be an inspirational leader. And for that reason, he's an inspiration for recruitment and finances. And so, for a lot of very good reasons, we ought to want to get him, and it ought to be the priority it is.
LAMB: Why haven't we gotten him?
TOWNSEND: Well, this is not an easy area to operate in. We believe that - we have reason to believe that he's been in this tribal area. It's an ungoverned space. It's been an ungoverned space since the borders, the Durand Line was drawn.
It's an ungoverned space to Pakistan. And so, it's a very difficult area to operate in, not just for us, but for Pakistan themselves.
We have a strong ally in President Musharraf, but we need to do more. And so, we've been working with the government of Pakistan to understand how we can be more effective there.
LAMB: You know, a lot of people looking at this thing from the outside see a lot of duplicity on the part of the United States, whether it's our relationship with Pakistan and the attitude about democracy.
The same thing with Saudi Arabia. Our relations with Saudi Arabia and the kind of money that's involved. And we think the Saudi is sending money to the Sunni insurgents, and all that stuff. Those are all charges.
Where do you come down on that? And how many times have you been over in that part of the world?
TOWNSEND: Oh, OK. Well, let's start with the last question first.
During the course of my time, the almost five years, I would travel to Saudi Arabia, in particular, at least four times a year, and each time would meet with then Crown Prince and now King Abdullah, as well as senior members of the royal family.
I've been to Afghanistan and Jordan, to Yemen, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait. I mean, I've traveled throughout the region, and in all instances meeting with heads of state and senior members of the government to talk about our counterterrorism relationship.
Let's talk about this for a little bit, because I think it's important that people understand. When we talk about money coming from Saudi Arabia, we have found no evidence, no intelligence that the government of Saudi Arabia is financing either al Qaeda or Sunni insurgents. And I think it's an important distinction.
There's a difference between the American government financing something and Americans, independent of their government, choosing to support causes that is contrary to U.S. policy. That's what we find. And we worked very hard with the government of Saudi Arabia to identify and stop that.
They've made a number of arrests of those who they believe to be supporting the financial aspects of terrorism. They've put a number - they've put cash courier laws in place. They've taken a number of steps as a government to try and restrict the ability of Saudi citizens to do these things that are contrary to Saudi government policy.
Have they been 100 percent successful? No. And there have been some frustrations.
They were going to set up - the king had taken a decision to set up a charities commission to try and regulate the use of charities to support these terrorist organizations. That hasn't happened yet. And we've had numerous discussions with the government of Saudi Arabia about the need for them to fulfill that commitment, and I can only presume those discussions continue.
With Pakistan, you know, many things, many of the disruption operations that have been successful - you know, we don't - you don't get a lot of credit when something doesn't happen. I understand that.
But let me use an example of something that would not have been successful without the help of the government of Pakistan - the disruption in August of 2006. You may recall there was this plot where al Qaeda was going to blow up planes leaving London and coming to the United States.
One of the critical enabling factors in the disruption of that plot, one was our relationship, obviously, and our information exchange with the British. But it was also our relationship with Pakistan. Now, I can't talk about why that is, because it's classified, but Pakistan was a critical player in helping us disrupt that terrorist attack, which would have been as big, if not bigger than September the 11th.
Does that mean that we only work on a counterterrorism basis with Pakistan or Saudi Arabia? No. We work a broad range of foreign policy issues, including the president's freedom agenda.
There have been - we continue to - there have been elections, municipal elections in Saudi Arabia. It was unthinkable. It was unthinkable when the president took office that such a thing would have happened. And so, we continue to see developments.
Are they as fast as we would like? Are they as broad as we would like? No. But you've got to start somewhere, and we've got to continue to work with them.
President Musharraf has taken off the uniform. The tragic killing of Benazir Bhutto - we will see elections. I mean, so, there are movements in the right direction.
And again, I think what we've got to ask ourselves is, are we better engaging on these issues of democratization and freedom, even where we're frustrated that it's not broad or deep enough? And I think the answer that we come to is yes.
LAMB: Why must we sell all those weapons to either Saudi Arabia or Pakistan - or Israel, for that matter?
TOWNSEND: Well …
LAMB: And does that ever end?
TOWNSEND: The weapons sales are important, because of regional security and instability. I mean, you've got both in India and Pakistan nuclear powers. You've got factionalization (ph) continuing and unrest in Iraq, despite progress that we've seen there.
And so, the weapons sales really come down to a regional security program. But they're not independent of one another. This is looked at in a much more holistic way.
LAMB: Why do we insist on a democracy in Iraq? And I know we might insist on it in Saudi Arabia, but there's no evidence that it's going there.
TOWNSEND: Well, it's not - the president has talked about what democracy means. We have - we know what democracy means to us in terms of elections, in terms of - even at a local level, all the way up to a federal system.
Each of these countries is going to have to decide what democratization looks like to them. There are some basic fundamentals in terms of freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of religion. But each of them are going to have to decide in terms of their own development what that's going to look like.
And that's why I say, Brian, will it be - will it mirror us? I don't expect it will. Will it satisfy us that it is as broad and deep as we would like to see it? Perhaps not. But I think we've got to continue to push and engage in that.
You know, we saw elections in Kuwait where a majority of the seats in the parliament wind up in the hands of those with far more extremist views. And so, the pace at which reform takes place and democratization takes place has got to be measured by their own internal political dynamic.
LAMB: How long did you work for Janet Reno?
TOWNSEND: Let's see, from '94 until she left office.
LAMB: How close did you get with her?
TOWNSEND: You know, it's funny. We were total strangers when I arrived at Main Justice. I didn't know her at all. I had no personal connection to her. I was working as the chief of staff to the head of the criminal division, who was obviously a political appointee.
And we did become very good friends. When my son was born, she came to the house to visit him. She was at my wedding. I mean, so we became personal friends.
LAMB: Are you still in touch?
TOWNSEND: Absolutely. Absolutely.
LAMB: Why then would the Bush White House hire you?
TOWNSEND: You're asking the wrong person. I can - it's a great story, because I was surprised, frankly.
To be fair, I am a lifelong, registered Republican. I was a Republican - I registered as a Republican in Nassau County when I turned 18, back on …
LAMB: That's New York.
TOWNSEND: Yes. Back on Long Island. And have remained a Republican. But because I was in government - I went into government right out of law school - I've never been politically active.
I came down. I worked for Janet Reno on security and law enforcement issues. And I can remember leaving the Justice Department, and I was at the Coast Guard. This would have been just before September the 11th.
And like many working mothers, the last thing on my list of things to do becomes my own - things related to me, particularly my health issues. And so, I had had a discussion with my husband about needing to go for my annual physical, which I hadn't done.
And I got back to my office one day after lunch, and there was a message to call Dr. Rice. And I called my husband, very angry, and said, "How dare you call some strange doctor and make an appointment for me," because it never occurred to me that it was that Dr. Rice.
LAMB: Condoleezza.
TOWNSEND: Condoleezza Rice. And I went in to see her. She wanted to see me.
I was at the Coast Guard as the head of their intelligence unit. This is now spring of 2003. And I went to see her, and we were talking about the deputy's position.
And frankly, it was a very good interview. You can imagine, I was so impressed with her and how bright she was. She asked me a lot of questions about my experience on the international side and law enforcement, intelligence issues that the administration was confronting.
And at the end of the interview I said, "You understand, I worked for Janet Reno."
At the time, Reno was seeking the Democratic nomination in Florida to run against the president's brother for the governor of Florida.
And her question was very simple - she had never asked me in the course of the interview about politics - and her question to me was really quite simple. Would I support the president and the president's policies, and would I give him my best advice? And the answer to that was, absolutely. And I wound up going through the process, met with the president's chief of staff and was offered the position.
It gave me great respect for the history and the culture of the National Security Council, which really is one of bringing in career public servants from the State Department and around government, so that the president is getting the most experienced people and the best advice he can get. And it's frankly a tradition and culture I've tried to incorporate in the Homeland Security Council as I was running that.
LAMB: What can you describe as the difference between working inside a Democratic administration and a Republic administration?
TOWNSEND: You know, I'm not sure that I think that there are huge differences. I mean, all administrations' senior political people try to identify the career people, regardless of party, that they can rely on and trust for good advice.
I think the relationship between political people and career people is not so different, at least in my experience. In both instances, people wanted confidence. They wanted good advice. They didn't much care, and they were not really looking behind to find out what was your political agenda or even if you had one. What they wanted was substantive advice.
And so, I can't tell you that I really think, in terms of the relationship between career and political people and how the government works, that I found it to be very different.
LAMB: Will you align yourself with anybody between now and the end of the campaign?
TOWNSEND: You know, I've been very clear that I didn't want to get involved in the primaries. I wanted to - and I've - because I've never been involved in politics, this is a subject which I approach pretty cautiously.
The honest answer is, I don't know. I'm going to wait and see. And if I were to get involved, it would not be until the general - until both parties had nominees.
LAMB: Let's say it's January 20, 2009. These candidates are all promising a lot of things.
What can they not promise? And when they get to that Oval Office, what will we not see happen, in your opinion?
TOWNSEND: Well, you know, I think all will promise to make a priority of protecting the U.S. But nobody can promise that the next attack won't happen.
Look at (ph) this president. What you can promise is, it's your first priority to stop it.
So, I think we've got to be careful about electing someone because we think that's the person that will be sure that that next attack doesn't happen, because nobody can really promise you that.
Here's what I find disturbing, one of the things that made me think it was good for me to leave government so I could help frame this issue. During the course of the primaries, we haven't heard any of the candidates on either side talk seriously, in a substantive way, about the security issues - other than to criticize. Everybody's decided how they would do it different - that they would do it differently than the president, that they disagree with the president's policies.
None of them have offered substantive answers to whether it's intelligence collection, interrogation techniques, Guantanamo. What would they do about it?
And frankly, I think the American people deserve more. Even if you're an American citizen, sitting there listening and you say, "I don't really think there's going to be another attack," don't you think you want to know now, if there were an attack, what do those candidates propose to do? And how are they going to use their legal authorities and their executive power, because it's become such an important issue to this country now.
And so, I actually think I have something that I can bring to help frame those issues. But I think we need to be asking the candidates how they're going to - on a substantive level - how they're going to deal with these issues, because I think it's been reduced, frankly, to sound bites right now.
LAMB: Well, if somebody says, as one of the candidates does, I will start bringing those troops - or I'll have them all out of there in 16 months - do you believe it?
TOWNSEND: Well, look. I think - again, this is a convenient sound bite. But until those candidates can say what they will do in terms of troop reduction and how they will pull them out in a way that doesn't destabilize Iraq, I don't take those promises seriously, and I don't think the American people should.
LAMB: I mean, Richard Nixon said that he had a secret plan to get us out of Vietnam, and everything wasn't shut down over there until '75. That was '68 to '75.
Let's go back again. If somebody says, "I will stop the war now," will they do that when they get in the Oval Office? Can they do that?
TOWNSEND: No. And I - they can't. They won't. And the question will become - they're going to have to look at all of the intelligence and make a decision based on the advice of military commanders on the ground, in the field, about what is realistic and what is responsible.
But the reason we don't hear them telling how they're going to get everybody out in 16 months is because they don't have those details. They don't - they haven't worked through them in their own minds.
And so, I think you can't expect that they're going to have those sort of plans that they can articulate until they're in office.
LAMB: So, why do we accept a candidate that says, "I'm going to - I will find and eliminate Osama bin Laden. I will stop this war. I will have all of our troops out of there in 16 months."
Why do we pay any attention to that?
TOWNSEND: Well, you know what? I'm not sure that I think the American people do pay a whole lot of attention to it.
I think they want to hear sort of broad principles and broad statements. But I think people accept that that's all they're going to get right now.
You know, we've been talking about dealing - look at the decades that we've been talking about dealing with the immigration problem. We finally get proposals on the table. It's so politically divisive that everybody walks away from it.
And so, do I think that there's a credible plan on the table right now from any of the candidates about how to deal with the immigration problem? No. We've seen that fail.
I've never seen an issue as politically divisive, other than the right-to-life issue, the right-to-life, right-to-choice issue as immigration has been in this country.
LAMB: So, what would you advise somebody on immigration? If somebody asked you, how do we stop immigration, what do we do with the illegal immigrants that are here in the country, what would you say?
TOWNSEND: Well, it's pretty obvious, I was working for the president when the president's immigration proposal went forward. I don't think - I don't think that you can take a single-path approach to this. Enforcement alone is not going to solve it.
You've got to deal with the illegals who are here. You've got to - there's got to be some path to citizenship. Those who do it legally ought to be first in line.
There are broad principles that the president articulated. But, I mean, to be fair, I was working for him. I obviously agree with him.
But I think that there's got to be a bipartisan approach. This is an issue that is not going to get solved by a single party. And we've got to make up our minds that this is an issue on which there's got to be compromise.
LAMB: In your own lifetime experience, what do you think had the most impact on you, any experience that you've had that got you to where you were the homeland security assistant for the president of the United States?
TOWNSEND: You know, it's interesting; 9/11, like most Americans, had a crucial impact on me, both personally and professionally.
But before September the 11th, I had this very interesting, eclectic career. I worked in law enforcement and intelligence, on operational matters and on policy matters. I worked as a prosecutor, but I also worked as a policy person. And so, I'd had this - I worked inside a military organization in a civilian bureaucracy. There was this sort of eclectic mix of experience.
But as it turned out, when September 11th happens, I think what people realized is, you needed someone with this broad experience who understood how the government worked, all the tools of national power and how to help others to bring them together in the most effective way.
LAMB: Well, let's go back very quickly through the process.
TOWNSEND: Sure.
LAMB: You were born where?
TOWNSEND: In Mineola, New York, on Long Island.
LAMB: Your parents did not graduate from high school.
TOWNSEND: That's correct. That's correct.
LAMB: You're the first person in the family to have a high school degree.
TOWNSEND: That's right.
LAMB: Why? What happened to your parents? Why didn't …
TOWNSEND: Well, the Depression. My parents did not come from a well-off family. My father was the son of immigrants. His father came from Greece, his mother from Switzerland. My mother was second generation. Her grandparents had come from Ireland.
They were basically poor people. They were laborers. And so, my father did various jobs. He enlisted for World War II. He was at Normandy. He was injured. And my mother was basically a secretary and a bookkeeper. And so, they had to work.
My mother's father, my grandfather on that side, had gotten gassed in World War I. He died when she was seven. And so, she was living in a single parent home during the Depression.
And so, it was a - I grew up in a very humble family. There were no political connections. There was no money. And so, as I was growing up - my father was a roofer, my mother was a bookkeeper - and they just made up their minds that the way out for me was an education.
LAMB: Why did you want to be an alter boy in the Catholic Church? And I stress alter "boy."
TOWNSEND: Yes. Well, alter boy, because there were at that point in time no alter girls. I had been raised in Catholic school. I was a daily communicant. I used to walk to church every morning before going to school.
And I felt like I wanted to participate more fully in mass. And so, I wrote to everyone, including the pope, trying to understand why I couldn't be an alter girl. And it was just not permitted at the time.
This is a little bit of me ahead of my time, because now, of course, the Catholic Church does permit girls to be alter girls.
LAMB: You went to college where?
TOWNSEND: American University here in Washington.
LAMB: Political science among other things.
TOWNSEND: Yes.
LAMB: Psychology.
TOWNSEND: That's right.
LAMB: Why political science, if you didn't consider yourself a political person?
TOWNSEND: Well, you know, it's interesting, because when I was in high school, I had a social studies teacher that allowed us to get extra credit if we participated in a political campaign. And so, for my state assemblyman in Long Island, Fred Parola (ph), and then my congressman, Norman Lent, I actually did. I knocked on doors. I was a campaign staffer, and really enjoyed it.
So, I had an interest in political science and government. I also had this interest in psychology, and I hadn't quite decided what I was going to do. So when I went to American University I did a dual degree program.
I knew when I went down there, though, that I wanted to go to law school. And so, I did that, the two degrees, in three years, graduated cum laude and then went off to the University of San Diego Law School.
LAMB: Why San Diego?
TOWNSEND: Well, that was a decision made based on someone I was dating at the time who lived out there. Literally, I applied to San Diego, get accepted. The romance is long since over, but San Diego was beautiful, and decided if I was going to go to law school, why not do it someplace pretty?
LAMB: From law school you went where?
TOWNSEND: To the Brooklyn D.A.'s office. I graduated from law school in 2.5 years. And so, I was 22 when I graduated from law school. Two weeks later turned 23 and start my first job in the Brooklyn D.A.'s office, where Elizabeth Holtzman is the district attorney at the time.
LAMB: What was she like?
TOWNSEND: You know, it was very interesting, because I had no interaction with her. Never met her, had never seen her.
But a funny story, I'm leaving - I had done my three years, I guess, and I had accepted a position in the Southern District of New York from Rudy Giuliani, who was the U.S. attorney at the time. And when I was leaving I thought, this is very odd. I worked in this office and I had never met the district attorney, so I asked to see her.
This was thought very sort of impertinent. She didn't do exit interviews. It was just - but I have a lot respect. She - OK, if I wanted to see her.
I went in. It was a very short meeting, but I really went in for no other purpose than to say what a formative experience it had been, how much responsibility I had gotten and how much confidence that had given me as a trial lawyer, and how grateful I was for the experience.
So, I really didn't go in to complain. I just went in to say thank you.
LAMB: Now, she ended up being a congresswoman.
TOWNSEND: That's right. That's right.
LAMB: And she's a Democrat.
TOWNSEND: That's right. A liberal Democrat.
LAMB: How many lawyers in the D.A.'s office in Brooklyn?
TOWNSEND: Oh, hundreds, actually hundreds.
LAMB: OK. The next one is a Republican.
TOWNSEND: That's right. That's right.
LAMB: Why Rudy Giuliani? And was that a political job?
TOWNSEND: It was not a political job. Assistant U.S. attorneys are career appointments. They're - in fact, there's a prohibition in the department from considering political affiliation in the hiring of assistant U.S. attorneys. Nobody asked me.
An interesting story. I wanted to work for Giuliani, because I really viewed him as the Dewey of my generation. Remember, they were doing the commission case and Mafia cases. I mean, it was a - he was a tremendous force in the law enforcement and prosecution world. And I wanted the opportunity to work for him.
The Southern District was renowned for having former law clerks and law review and Ivy League. I didn't fit the bill at all and didn't have a whole lot of hope of getting in.
So it turned out, when I was in the D.A.'s office, I was working with a group of policemen who were working with the FBI. Unbeknownst to me, the things they were asking me for were pieces of the Pizza Connection case. The lead prosecutor on that was Louie Freeh, who was in the Southern District of New York at the time.
When that prosecution was successfully concluded, the agent said, "Would you like to meet Louie Freeh?" And I said, "Sure."
So, I went over for coffee and told him I'd like to apply. And Louie Freeh encouraged me to apply. He said, "I can't help you in terms of your application. You're going to stand or fall on your own. But I think you should apply. We need more people with local trial experience."
And I went through the process and was fortunate enough to be hired by then U.S. Attorney Giuliani.
LAMB: But Louie Freeh went on to be a judge?
TOWNSEND: He went on to be a judge, and then the director of the FBI.
LAMB: Did you work with him when he was director of the FBI?
TOWNSEND: I did. I did. In fact, there had been a good deal - it's now well known - there had been a good deal of policy disagreements between Director Freeh and the Clinton administration, and some with Janet Reno.
When I was asked to be - when Janet Reno asked me to become the counsel for intelligence policy and review, I said to her, I wouldn't make a decision about that without talking to Director Freeh, who had been a mentor to me my entire career. She asked me not to call him. She wanted to speak to him first.
So, next thing I knew, Louie Freeh called my house, as the director of the FBI, to encourage me to take the job, because he thought the position itself - the intelligence policy, the FISA position, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act position in the Justice Department - was so important, there needed to be somebody there that both he and the attorney general trusted and respected to give them advice. And that's how I wound up in that job.
LAMB: Is there a - was there a difference between the way they looked at FISA in the Reno-Freeh administration and the way they looked at it in the Bush administration?
TOWNSEND: Yes, but it - you know, I think of it less as being a stark difference as an evolution over time.
Remember, the terrorism problem we've got developing - I mean, it's not - this is not a black-and-white kind of issue. It just isn't, as much as I think there have been efforts to make it look that way.
There was the East Africa embassy bombings. There were the Cole bombings.
LAMB: What year was that?
TOWNSEND: East Africa was '98. The Cole bombing was in 2000.
LAMB: Ninety-eight, 2000.
TOWNSEND: And so, you've got - and then there's also the millennium bombing. It doesn't - the millennium threat doesn't happen. But 2000 going into 2001, where we understand now Ahmed Rassam is going to come in from Canada into - or across the Seattle, Washington, border. He's intercepted with a car bomb, and we understand there's a plot underway that we're trying to disrupt.
And so, there are these series of terrorism cases that - and you can see it developing. And by the time we get to the millennium case, I advocate that we use FISA as an investigative tool, without prejudice to the fact that we may want criminal prosecutors to actually take this case criminally. I don't think one precludes the other. And Attorney General Reno and Director Freeh agree with that.
And so, you can see there's a more - there's developing over time a more aggressive use of intelligence collection authorities to disrupt plots, without precluding potential criminal prosecutions. In other words, it's not - we come to the conclusion we don't have to make an either/or decision at the investigative stage. And this is developing over time.
There was more information sharing. You know, we had had this issue about, is there a legal wall, a bar to be use of information? We had a disagreement during the Clinton administration with the FISA Court. And now, ultimately, the FISA Court of Appeals, in the early days of the Bush administration, overturns the underlying court, the FISA Court.
That hadn't happened yet, but there was clearly - I guess what I'd leave you with, Brian, is this sense of there was a developing more belief that we needed a more aggressive use of intelligence authorities to fight terrorism. And, of course, when September 11th happens, it's no longer a developing belief. The switch gets flipped, not just in the executive branch, but in Congress, that there needs to be greater legal authorities that allow us to prevent an attack.
LAMB: What does the media look like from inside government? And how often do you say, when you get up and you read an article, that's just not true?
TOWNSEND: Well, it's a combination of either it's just not true, or it's devastating that I'm going to pick up the newspaper and see that in there.
I can't tell you how many times I've said to myself, looking at a newspaper, why do I - why am I reading this, because it will make my job and the jobs of thousands of public servants harder to prevent the next attack.
We often find - I mean, you know, the saying is, there are no secrets in Washington. It's become more and more true, where classified information is leaked.
And I frankly don't understand what the purpose is on the part - I understand the media. If they get it, they're going to print it. I don't understand what's the driver on the part of the person who has chosen to share that secret.
LAMB: But haven't you had people that you've worked around that you knew leaked things for their own political reasons?
TOWNSEND: Well, and people who shared their - if I knew somebody had actually, intentionally shared classified information, I would have filed a crimes report.
I mean, do I know that there are people who talked to reporters to advance their own agenda, their own opinion, policy positions? Yes.
Do I think that happens? Yes. I mean, I'd be naive to be working in Washington and …
LAMB: But haven't you had your own conversations with a journalist where you say, I don't want to be seen in this story, but I'll guide you by saying, head in that direction?
TOWNSEND: You know, you have to make - Louie Freeh gave me very good advice. And that was, don't talk to a reporter unless you're willing to do it on the record and have yourself be named, regardless of what the ground rules are. You've got to make up your mind that, unless you're willing to be quoted by name, then don't talk to them, regardless of what their rules are. And that's a pretty good rule that's guided me.
So, I have to tell you that my attitude about that is, while there are often ground rules to what the circumstances of the conversation are, I've not said anything that I wasn't willing to stand by, or as I've told my sons, the "Washington Post" test. Don't do it unless you're willing to have it in the paper.
LAMB: Well, you know the American people don't much believe what goes on here in this town, either from the president or from the Congress, and the approval ratings are down at the 30 percent or below level. Why?
TOWNSEND: Well, I think people are tired of the - as I said to you, when I left government, I was tired of the acrimony, the posturing. I mean, I think people take positions on things that are purely political, that they don't even believe the substance in.
I will tell you that I think that the Protect America Act - when we had that vote in August, I think if you go back and look at some of the presidential candidates and their votes on the Protect America Act, you'll find that there are those who voted against it, that if you asked them privately, substantively, whether you think that the statute itself is correct, they would tell you yes. But they voted a particular way because of constituencies like the ACLU.
LAMB: I have a book here that's just out called "The Commission," by Philip Shenon of the "New York Times," "The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation."
And I'll take a little time here to read this. There's a conversation with him that the publisher sent out, which they often do with these books. And the first question they had of Mr. Shenon was, "What does this book reveal about the 9/11 Commission that the public didn't know?"
And I want to walk through and get your reaction.
TOWNSEND: Sure.
LAMB: He says - "New York Times" reporter Shenon says many, many things. "I suspect some readers will be most alarmed by the book's disclosures about the relationship between Phil Zelikow, the commission's executive director, and officials in the Bush White House, especially Zelikow's secret communications with Karl Rove, President Bush's political guru, and with Condoleezza Rice. I think many people in Washington are, to this day, unaware of Zelikow's involvement on President Bush's 2001 transition team and of his role as the principal author of the 2002 White House strategy memo that was used a year later to justify the invasion of Iraq."
I'll just stop there for the moment.
TOWNSEND: Sure.
LAMB: What's your sense when you hear that?
TOWNSEND: You know, it's interesting to me. Philip's relationship with Condoleezza Rice was not a secret. They had written a book together. They had worked together. That he had a professional and personal relationship with Dr. Rice is not a secret, and so, I don't think people would be surprised by that.
LAMB: But just for a second, Condoleezza Rice at this time would have been inside the White House …
TOWNSEND: National security advisor.
LAMB: … as the national security director.
TOWNSEND: That's right.
LAMB: He was working for the commission …
TOWNSEND: That's right.
LAMB: … which was established by both the House, Senate and the president.
TOWNSEND: That's right.
LAMB: A separate, distinct body from all those people.
TOWNSEND: Right.
LAMB: As the executive director.
TOWNSEND: That's right. And there were interactions with that, access to witnesses, documents that were handled through White House counsel's office.
That they had a personal - you know, in Washington, many of us - I continue to this day - you asked me in the beginning of the interview, have I kept in touch with Janet Reno. Yes, I have.
Jamie Gorelick, who I consider a mentor and a friend, who was the deputy attorney general in the Clinton administration - there are many people that I've kept in touch with and talk with me, who also continue to have an interest in current legal issues and policy set by the administration.
Does it mean that they're going to be able to influence me in any improper way? No. But those friendships and relationships don't stop just because an election has taken place.
And I think that's really what's going on here. Did Philip's relationship with Condoleezza Rice stop? No. Did that mean he could improperly influence the outcome of a decision on access to documents or witnesses that way? No. There was a process set up for that through counsel's office.
And so, I don't - while I think people may want to paint some nefarious picture to this, I think those of us who have worked and lived in Washington long enough understand that these relationships and friendships continue, but there's integrity on both sides of it.
LAMB: The question was asked in this P.R. flyer, "You covered the commission for nearly two years. Why wasn't this information disclosed earlier?"
"The commission staff director" - here is the answer - "Philip Zelikow effectively shut off all communication between the commission staff and reporters. They were ordered not to talk to reporters under any circumstances. He even tried to shut off communication between the staff and the 10 commissioners.
"So, during the life of the investigation, virtually all information had to be funneled through Zelikow and his deputies. Much of the information disclosed in this book comes from staff investigators who agreed to speak to me only long after the commission shut its doors."
TOWNSEND: Well, look. When I was in the U.S. attorney's office in New York, there was a policy that the U.S. attorney had that we didn't talk to reporters either. That all had to go through the press office. This is not unusual.
The White House press office controls our interaction with the press when I was at the White House. I also don't read anything nefarious into that.
I will tell you that I don't have any reason to think that Philip was influenced - or the commission, therefore - in any way by his relationship either with Karl - which I can only presume was very limited - or with Condoleezza Rice.
And I will tell you, you know, there was - I understand when the book, this information was getting released, that there is the inference that he then came into the administration, and there are …
LAMB: Because Philip Zelikow came back to the State Department, working for Condoleezza Rice.
TOWNSEND: That's right. I will tell you, having sat in my share of policy meetings with Philip, that Philip frequently had policy disagreements, whether it was with the political folks in the White House or the policy folks on the National Security Council, the legal folks, the Homeland Security Council.
Philip's positions were not - I mean, if people are suggesting that his policy positions were completely aligned, that's just not the case.
LAMB: What is your sense? Someday, will it come out there was another reason for this president to go into Iraq than we know now?
TOWNSEND: No. You know, I think that people can disagree with the president's policy positions. But I've said it before and I'll take the opportunity.
To question his integrity and his passion is completely unwarranted. This is a man who is among the most principled human beings I've ever known. He did what he believed was right, based on the facts that were presented to him. And oh, by the way, he's not the only one who, based on the facts, believed that going into Iraq was the right thing.
Now, was he well served by the intelligence that he received? No, he wasn't. Nor were the members of Congress. Nor were the American people.
And so, we've done a lot to fix that through intelligence reform, the director of national intelligence. We've tried to put processes and structures in place that will better serve this president and future presidents.
LAMB: What can you tell us about former CIA Director George Tenet?
TOWNSEND: Well, look. I have a lot of respect for George Tenet, and I think George Tenet was incredibly aggressive and committed, not only to the intelligence process, but to the men and women of the CIA. And I think that's what you want in a CIA director.
I think that we've - I think that what we needed to - we've done now what we needed to do, but I'm not sure it was George Tenet's job to do it. Intelligence reform had to be undertaken by the president and by Congress. The CIA director alone couldn't have done it.
And so, we've done that now, and I feel much more confident that we have a structure in place that better serves the policy process.
LAMB: A lot of people have, as you know, gone over this 9/11 thing upside, one down - you know …
TOWNSEND: Right.
LAMB: … constantly reviewing it, pointing fingers, blaming people.
Folks like you in your position say, this is going to happen again. We're going to get another attack.
What's all that money gone to, if we're going to get another attack? And can you blame people then in the past, if it's going to happen again?
TOWNSEND: Well, the fact that people like me say, it will happen again, is not that the money or the reforms have been inadequate. That's testimony to the determination and tenacity of our enemies, not - it's not a reflection that we've spent poorly or planned poorly.
You've just got to understand, it's the old story, you know. We have to be right every day; they have to get lucky one time. And so, the odds are just in their favor that that's going to happen.
The reforms, the money spent - I mean, I think that there's been a lot of improvement. The Department of Homeland Security is now a much more mature organization, working with state and local officials, than we could have expected in its short life so far. And it will continue to become more effective over time under Secretary Chertoff's leadership.
And so, I mean, I really think - I think the leadership of Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman, they've really approached on the Senate side homeland security oversight in a very what I consider to be a mature, bipartisan way in terms of what's in the best interests of the country. And so, with that kind of - with those sorts of relationships in place, I think we're doing what we can.
Here's what I think the American people have a right to hold us accountable for. And that is, we're not allowed to make the same mistakes twice that result in the deaths of Americans. And so, if there's another attack, and you find that your government has made the same mistake a second time, people ought to be held accountable.
Let me give you an example - information sharing. What we found from the 9/11 Commission, what we found from our own review, was that there were bits of information inside the government that we possessed, that we didn't do very well at sharing. The president has put in place an information-sharing strategy. We have an information sharing executive.
If there's another attack, and you find that there are pieces of information in the government that could have been used to prevent it that they didn't share with one another, people ought to be held accountable, because, and I come back to, we can't make the same mistakes twice.
LAMB: Why do - and you hear stories. If you live in this town, you certainly hear them off the record and you read about them. Why is there so much infighting inside the government between the FBI and the CIA, and the CIA and the Justice Department, the Justice Department and the White House, and the White House and the Congress?
TOWNSEND: You know, I - look. If I knew the answer to that, I would probably …
LAMB: What's your sense, though?
TOWNSEND: Some of it is legal authorities. And, you know, it's the old story. It's all about turf.
People want to retain their authorities and their autonomy to influence and affect decisions. It's why you have, frankly, a National Security Council and a Homeland Security Council - to cut through that, to make sure what we're getting to are the best, most effective answers, and serving the president with the best, most effective options, as opposed to having parochial interests served of one or the other departments.
I don't think there's any way to stop it.
LAMB: After working for a D.A. in Brooklyn, an a U.S. attorney in the Southern District of New York and Rudy Giuliani, and working in the Justice Department under Janet Reno, and being a friend of Louie Freeh's and being in the White House - and did you know Richard Clarke?
TOWNSEND: I did.
LAMB: What do you think of him?
TOWNSEND: You know, Richard was very, very effective. One of the things I was always impressed by was his ability to work this interagency process. When you talk about the turf battles, Dick Clarke had a great ability to work the interagency process, an effective way to get people to get things done. And after all, that's the key.
Here's where I think, to be fair, he and I part company. I was very concerned when, after Dick left the White House and was critical of a particular administration in the context of a presidential election - this is the 2004 election - I worried that it meant that you wouldn't - future presidents - this president and future presidents - would be reluctant to bring career people from around the government to the National Security Council.
And I went to the president about it.
I don't think that any one career public servant ought to put at risk a future president's ability to get advice. And I think you've got to have - you can make your views known when you're inside the system. You can advocate. You can give your best advice. But you accept that they are elected political leaders who are going to make decisions.
And if they make a decision contrary to your advice, you've got two choices. You can stay and accept that, because you believe it's been made in an ethical way, or you can leave. But you don't get to stay, because you like the job or the position, and then criticize after you've left, having stayed when decisions were made.
I have a real problem with that. And I think the long-term impact of career public servants leaving government, criticizing and getting involved in politics, is a dangerous thing for the country.
LAMB: So, of all the jobs you've seen, which one do you want?
TOWNSEND: Oh, you know what? There are so many fabulous jobs in the government. I've enjoyed every single one of them. I could not have imagined, as you pointed out, the daughter of two people who didn't graduate from high school, that I would ever be serving the president.
There are any host of jobs that I would love to come back to in government, and I hope I get the opportunity to come back and serve again.
LAMB: What's the job, though, that you think would be the most stimulating? Attorney general, head of the FBI, head of the CIA, head of homeland security?
TOWNSEND: Any one of them. I would - there's not one of them I wouldn't do.
To be honest with you, they all have different - they all appeal to me for different reasons in different parts of my career. You know, I was a prosecutor. It was my first job. I have a great love and respect for the Justice Department, and I loved my time there.
You know, I tell people I wound up in the federal government, because of an FBI agent, Louie Freeh. And so, my heart - I've got a special place in my heart for the FBI and the work that they do, and lost a very dear friend on September 11. So, I've got a special place for them.
CIA, I've had - I've done tremendous work during my time in the White House on intelligence reform and done a lot of work, particularly the CIA officers out in the field. And they are a critical piece to why we've not seen an attack. And so, I've got a real special place in my heart for the CIA.
And the department I've had the privilege of working with, virtually since its inception and think its work is important, too.
And so, any one of those would be a privilege.
LAMB: I assume that friend was John O'Neill, the FBI agent, who was killed …
TOWNSEND: Yes.
LAMB: … on September the 11th. Former FBI agent at the time.
TOWNSEND: That's right.
LAMB: There's been a lot written about him. Why?
TOWNSEND: John was a sort of flamboyant, controversial figure. Counterterrorism was his life, and it was an interest of his before it became really a national issue.
He had been very involved internationally, talking with foreign intelligence services about counterterrorism. He had been close to and a good friend of Dick Clarke's, and working with Dick Clarke when he was in the White House.
And so, he had become a real respected figure in the counterterrorism community.
And I had had the privilege of working with him on the East African bombings, the Cole bombing. He was deployed over to Yemen as the lead agent on the Cole bombing.
And so, I had worked with him on a number of major terrorism prosecutions. And that was a small group of people who had really developed an expertise before September 11.
LAMB: So, should we have known about Osama bin Laden? I know we knew about him. But should we have known that this attack was coming on 9/11? And if we should have, why didn't we?
TOWNSEND: Well, it's difficult. I hesitate to use the word "should" - should we have known - because it's difficult to say that now, to be fair. There were so many pieces of information that we hadn't put together.
We didn't have the relationships we needed around the world at the level of transparency that we have them now. We didn't have the legal authorities.
If we'd had all those things, should we have known? Yes. But we didn't have them. And so, I think it's not helpful to do this sort of backwards-looking, should we have known.
I will tell you that, I think, there were many of us who were frustrated. Did we wish we had known? Were there - and wanted to know how could we improve the system. And that's why I say to you, I think it's critically important that those of us who were working counterterrorism wanted to be sure we'd fixed the system, so we didn't have those same feelings going forward.
LAMB: So, what - do you expect an attack - I mean, I'm talking about, if you're an al Qaeda operative - before the election or after the election? What's in their interest?
TOWNSEND: Well, you can imagine, this is a big debate.
I worry - and have said so - I worry about the period of vulnerability between sort of the time we have nominees for each party through and just after the inauguration of a new president. I think that's a particular period of vulnerability, because of what we know about their attempts, al Qaeda's attempts, to influence the elections in Spain, when Aznar was not re-elected. We've seen the attacks after Gordon Brown took over as prime minister in the U.K.
We see in the 2004 election where they were issuing videos days before the election, including of bin Laden, talking about the streets in the United States running with blood.
I mean, so they like to - we know from their history that al Qaeda wants to influence elections and have political influence. That's why I say I think I worry about a particular period of vulnerability. I'm not suggesting there's any intelligence to that effect. I'm just looking at historically what we've seen.
LAMB: OK. But from what you know - and let's say an event happens. What would you guess you would be saying about "I told you so? I told you that specific thing was going to happen."
Or you don't have to point your finger at anybody, but you feel that that specific thing will happen, based on what you know.
TOWNSEND: Well, what I've said is, I don't want to be in that position. And so, as I was leaving, one of the greatest priorities, I think, over the next 12 months is, we as - the current administration has a special obligation to have a far more robust transition plan in a post-9/11 world than we've ever seen before. And we had already begun planning for that.
I think that there needs to be - to do that effectively, whoever the president is, has got to be prepared, to have a national security team that can receive information and can begin to work together, literally from the time the election results are clear, through the inauguration. There's got to be a very seamless national security, homeland security transition.
I've suggested that there ought to be a joint meeting between the national security officials of the current administration and the incoming administration, and have a table-top exercise. A new administration will have their own way of doing things, but they certainly deserve the benefit of understanding how we've gone about it during this administration.
LAMB: Last - a couple of last questions.
What does your husband do?
TOWNSEND: A lawyer, here in town.
LAMB: How old are your children now?
TOWNSEND: Two boys, a 12-year-old in seventh grade and a six-year-old in first grade.
LAMB: And what are you going to do to make money in the foreseeable future?
TOWNSEND: Well, a bunch of things. I'm talking to media organizations. I'll probably do some consulting and some public speaking.
LAMB: Fran Townsend, thank you very much.
TOWNSEND: Thank you.